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ABSTRACT: The National Service Act of 1993 is viewed as a means of
inculcating a sense of personal and social responsibility in young
adults. The present emphasis on fiscal responsibility and budget
reduction implies that any new expenditure program be funded by
either: (a) reductions in present programs; or, (b) new taxes. As
new taxes are regarded as "politically incorrect" by legislators
seeking to extend their tenure, program cuts become mandatory. It
is proposed that military downsizing is one means of funding
national service; and that the tradeoff is suboptimal. Downsizing
adversely affects minorities and the least skilled - who benefit
most from military training. A new military enlistment option is
suggested as a means of improving access for the least advantaged
to the social mainstream and increasing the generation of human
capital. The new option would be funded by reducing the maximum
number of national service participants by 50%.
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COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCIES:
NATIONAL AND MILITARY SERVICE
Introduction
National service is an attempt by government to get young
people involved in vital issues facing today's society.

The

federal government will hire people to teach the illiterate, help
in police work, provide child care, and work on environmental
cleanup.

In return,

volunteers will receive a minimum wage,

educational/ training vouchers, and/or forgiveness of a portion of
outstanding student loans.
broad one.

The mission of national service is a

Its intent is to inculcate a sense of civic awareness

and social responsiblity, thereby strengthening the social fabric
while fostering marketable skills.

As presently structured,

national service contains philosophical elements of the Peace
Corps, the Job corps, and Vista.
While

national

service

services are being downsized.

is

being

nurtured,

the

military

In an environment where any increase

in the federal budget (increase in the deficit) must be accompanied
by either a decrease in existing programs or an increase in taxes,
it is not a logical contrivance to state that the two can be viewed
as substitute public goods in a constrained budget.

Efficiency

dictates that scarce tax dollars be channeled between the programs
in a manner which maximizes net social benefits.
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The National service Program
In the fall of 1993, the National Service and Community Trust
Act was approved by Congress.

The purpose of the law is, "to

establish a Corporation for National Service, enhance opportunities
for national service, and provide national service educational
awards to persons participating in such service, and for other
purposes." (Public Law 103-82, 103d Congress).

Commencing in 1994

with 25,000 participants and a budget of $400 million, the program
is projected to grow to 100,000 young men and women and a budget of
$3.4 billion by 1997.

Participants in the program agree to spend
In return,

one or two years in community-oriented service.
volunteers

earn the minimum wage for the period of

service

(approximately $7,000 per year) and $5,000 to $10,000, depending on
length of

service,

toward further education or

repayment

of

outstanding student loans (Economist, March 6, 1993).
National

(non-military) service has its earliest tangible

roots in the Civilian Conservation Corps, begun in 1933 to employ
thousands of young men in conservation and forestry projects. John
F. Kennedy instituted the Peace Corps in the early l960's to share
American know-how with less developed nations and to allow American
volunteers an understanding of the world beyond American shores.
The Peace Corps was (and is) modest in scope, including, at its
peak, no more·than 16,000 volunteers (Bernstein and Cock, 1993).
President Clinton's national service corps represents the
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largest effort at e�ploying young volunteers in the public welfare
since the Great Depression.

However, during the Depression the

focus was more on incomes support and public works and less on the
goal

of

fostering

the

spirit

of

community

and,

ultimately,

nationhood.
The most immediate antecedent of national service is embodied
in

the

National

Service

and

Community

Act

of

1990,

which

established pilot projects to test the viability of a national
service initiative (Economist, June 13, 1992).

The Corporation for

National Service will provide umbrella supervision and parcel
monies to similarly designed state commissions.

In turn, state

agencies would direct funds to community organizations providing
local services - who might benefit from an influx of youthful
volunteers.

President Clinton views the national service plan as,

"America at its best - building community, offering opportunity,
and rewarding responsibility" (Economist, March 6, 1993).
Plaws Inherent in National service
Advocates of national service view the program as mit_igating
a host of problems confronting today's youth: namely, the absense
of training opportunities; the lack of community involvement; and,
a

shortfall

in

personal

as

well

as

civic

responsibility.

Proponents see the program as working where the market does not or'
cannot;

growing "non-market" attributes such as cohesiveness,

social awareness,

and equity.

Furthermore,

national service
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addresses the problem of student loans (and their annual $2-$3
billion

in

debtor

defaults)

by

offering

national

participants redress from part of debt obligations.

service

Undoubtedly,

the program is an omnibus of good intentions.
However, the breadth of national service is also its flaw.
National Service seeks to target a number of relatively diverse
national ills with one program; becoming a social MIRV.

More

concretely, the costs of national service are not justified by its
benefits.

As in the Peace corps, the attractiveness of a "hitch"

in national service is skewed toward the college-educated and
college intended.

The forgiveness of educational debt repayment

makes the option particularly attractive to college-bound youth but
much less so to its non-college oriented cohort.

However, even if

the initiative is fully embraced by young people, only 2% or less
of the 14 million college students stand to benefit from the
legislation's provisions '(Economist, March 6, 1993).
costs of National service

The costs of national service have been understated by its
supporters.

First,

the program's advocates have noted that

national service can be accomplished without adding a level of

bureacracy.

It is difficult to envision a brand-new federal

program, with no existing organizational infrastructure, standing
without the "flying buttress" of significant new bureacratic
support.

Second,

there will be

substantial

training

costs
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associated with each placement in a community agency.

It is

inconceivable that young people can simply begin work in any
community service without substantial job-specific training. Using
existing state and local programs as a benchmark, training costs
may reach $18,000 per hire (Economist, March 6, 1993).
arithmetic,

With simple

the government's own estimates for 1997 amount to

$34,000 per participant.

But, it is a third cost accruing to

national service which provides the focus of the paper.
Military Downsizing: an opportunity Cost of National Service
Deficits averaging 3% to 5% of GDP have essentially guaranteed
that a new program of discernible size will be funded through
reductions in existing programs, given the political hazard of
raising taxes.

While the demise of the USSR and the end of the

cold war has allowed defense cuts, it is argued that the reductions
in defense expenditures (and military readiness) will be larger in
the presence, rather than the absense, of national service.

More

importantly, it is argued that military service accomplishes the
same

goals that national service

sets

out to

achieve,

more

effectively, more cost efficiently, and more equitably.
The Joint Product Nature of Military Training
First, it is worthwhile to distinguish between the aspects of
human and social capital development which accompany military
training.

In enhancing the recruit's physical and mental skills,

military service directly rewards the acquirer by shaping a more
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productive

labor

resource.

Succinctly,

military

experience

enhances the value of a trainee as a capital (human) asset.

The

return on the individual's self-investment is seen in a higher
rental price for labor services and a higher life cycle income.
Social capital Generation
Social capital generation refers to attributes nurished by the
military experience which result in social benefits of equal
magnitude for all citizens, veterans and non-veterans.

These

service-induced characteristics include a greater sense of personal
and community responsibility, adaptability, self-discipline, and a
greater exposure to and tolerance of differing viewpoints.

The

paper proposes that the quality of social capital produced through
the military experience is unique and superior to that generated in
other venues: e. g. , national service.

Admittedly, measuring the

value of social capital produced as a by-product of any endeavor is
a difficult task.

Yet, it does not require an undue stretch of the

imagination to project that the social capital attributable to
military service (self and group responsibilty, discipline) would
be superior to that produced in the campus-like atmosphere of a
national service program.

It is perceived that human and social

capital are a joint product of military training (Sondey, 1994).
Technology and Transferability
One measure of the applicability and value of military
training in the civilian sector is the technological content of
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military jobs.

The technological content of the military job has

increased significantly over time. For example, in 1945, white
collar labor constituted 28% of the military labor force; whereas
today, nearly 50% of armed forces military specialties (personnel
assignment codes) are considered white collar (Binkin, 1986).

Not

only is military training more technologically intensive and less
apt to be military-specific in nature, but the "grunt" aspects of
military training (mess hall duty, grounds maintenance, janitorial)
are increasingly out-sourced to civilian firms.
A counterpart of the technological infusion into military jobs
has been the improved transferability of military training to the
civilian

sector.

Magnum

and

Ball

(1989)

found

a

skill

transferability rate of 45%-50% for military inculcated skills, a
higher

rate

than

previously

estimated.

The

enhanced

transferability is likely to be a function of the increasing
overlap between job characteristics in the military and civilian
sectors.

It is also likely to result from the greater degree of

individual choice in enlistment and career paths (Sondey, 1994).
Magnum and Ball also noted that the transferability rate from
military training was equal to the rate from civilian

(non

employer) training.
Veteran's Premium: Its Existence
Evidence of the unique human capital productivity of the
milit�ry services is provided through a number of longitudinal
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studies which studied veterans' earnin gs in civilian life.

With

respect to World War II and Korean veterans, the body of evidence
points to a positive and significant pay premium relative to the
non-veteran cohort (Little and Fredland,

1979; Martindale and

Poston, 1979). Conversely, the premium for Vietnam veterans may be
negative.

'However, it is suggested that the absense of a premium

for Vietnam veterans may be attributable to an adverse civilian
labor market - supersaturated by an influx of baby-boomers and
female entrants (DeTray, 1982; Little and Fredland, 1979).

Or, it

may be that the premium takes considerable time ( longer than
covered by the studies) to reveal itself.

In any case, the author

agrees with Schwartz (1986), who regard the Vietnam era as an
outlier, in terms of its effect on post-service earnings.
The "outlier" hypothesis . is implicitly supported by the
findings of Magnum and Ball

(1989) who studied the civilian

earnings of veterans in the post-draft (post-Vietnam) period.

They

found that an earnings premium for veterans of the all volunteer
military did exist,

and evidenced itself within two years of

entrance into civilian employment.
source of the Veteran's Premium

What is the source of the veteran's wage differential? then,
DeTray (l982)·and Little and Fredland (1979) attribute the.premium·
to two factors:

(1) differences in investment in education, by

veterans and .non-veterans; and, (2) the perception, by employers,
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of veteran status as a credential.
Veterans of World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and of the all
volunteer era have had access to educational rights of differing
dimensions.
invest

in

By and large, veterans have exercised these rights to
education

and

training,

thereby

developing

marketable skills than the non-veteran counterpart.

more

Concurrently,

employers seeking to fill vacancies view veteran status as they
might weigh added civilian training, a credential which: (a) is an
effective screening device in winnowing the queue of job seekers;
and,

(b) a characteristic which enhances the value of labor

services, necessitating a higher rental price.

In this perception,

veteran status provides a certification to the hiring firm that the
applicant

is

trainable

and

responsibility and initiative.

capable

of

a

certain

level

of

In short, an honorable discharge

certifies that the veteran has been pre-screened and found capable
by the military (Little a'nd Fredland, 1979).
So far, the paper has sought to convince the reader of the
existence and value of human and social capital created by the
military experience. Next, we will consider the question of those
who will become worse-off as the result of military down-sizing blacks and other minorities.
The Military, African-Americans, and Buman capital Acquisition
Since the advent of the all volunteer service in 1973, blacks
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have volunteered in disproportionate numbers.
up

more

than

20%

of

the

approximately 30% of the Army.

combined

Today, blacks make

military

services

and

While the percentage of young,

black youth enlisting has declined slightly in recent years, the
overall black composition of the services has remained almost
constant.

This equilibrium is attributable to the fact that blacks

are selecting to remain in the service for longer periods than
whites.
African-Americans now constitute a higher percentage of the
top three enlisted grades than in previous decades {Binkin, 1993).
Economists would argue that blacks are making calculated economic
decisions in choosing to enlist and remain in the military.

The

decision to enlist is buttressed by the potential for training and
human

capital

acquisition

and

is

made

opportunity costs in the civilian sector.

in

full

light

of

Critics of the higher

black composition of the military would condense the economist's
perspective to a failure of government and the private sector to
provide ample non-service training opportunities and · jobs for
blacks. Nonetheless, African-Americans are acting in rational self
interest by choosing to serve in the armed forces.
The "Bridging" Effect of Military service

Military service has been characterized as a ladder

of

socioeconomic mobility and a bridge which allows young minorities
access to the economic mainstream.

In examining the earnings of
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World War II, Korea, and Vietnam veterans relative to their nonveteran cohort, Martindale and Poston (1979) find a particularly
strong,

positive

relationship

between

civilian

earnings

and

military service for African and Mexican-Americans.
Little and Fredland (1979), studied disaggregated data from
the National Longitudinal survey on the earnings of men aged 45 to
66,

and concluded that military service has a significant and

positive effect on civilian earnings many years after service.
They compared the positive effects of service on the civilian
earnings of blacks and whites.

White veterans earned incomes 5% to

10% higher than their non-veteran counterpart, while Hispanic and
African-American veterans earned 13% - 15% more than their nonveteran

cohort.

For

white

veterans,

this

service-connected

increment to income was equal to the return of another year of
formal education or four to seven added years of job tenure.

For

African-Americans, the service-caused increment is equivalent to
two to three years additional formal schooling or seven added years
of job tenure.
It is no surprise that a strong, direct relationship exists
between years of formal education completed and the availability of
rights to subsidized education under the historical menu of GI
Bills.

Little and Fredland

(1979) ·found that white veterans

averaged one more year of post-military training than
civilian cohort.

. .

their

However, minority veterans averaged two and a
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half additional years of formal education when compared to their
non-veteran counterpart.
The weight of the literature suggests that while both blacks
and whites benefit from military service, blacks benefit more than
whites.

It follows that blacks will suffer greater economic

hardships than whites from ongoing military force reductions.
A New Military Enlistment Option
Despite its pro forma recognition of the need to empower and
create a civic leadership base among "residents of low-income
communities, " the national service program is focused on the
college-oriented segment of the youthful cohort.

Certainly, the

"forgiveness" aspect for educational loans will appeal to upwardly
mobile youth, both white and of color.

However, national service

will bypass the majority of non-college directed youth.

It is this

group of "underachievers" that stands to benefit most from the
proposed military program.
The new enlistment option would require a twelve month period
of active service, followed by optional duty in the reserves
at the discretion of recruit and military service.

A program for

accession into the career ranks would allow the best of the new
recruits the option of a military career and open a new pipeline of
skilled recruits to the career military.

Training would consist of

four months of basic military training and eight months of training
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in a military operating specialty skill.

At the completion of

enlistment, each recruit would be allowed a $5, 000 stipend for
college or vocational civilian training.

Additionally, student

loans in the amount of $10, 000 (ceiling adjustable) would allow the
recruit

to

complete

an

extended

period

of

civilian

education/training.
Funding the New Enlistment Option
It is further proposed that the new military option be funded
by reducing the scope of the national service program.

At present,

national service is budgeted at $3.4 billion (100, 000 participants)
for fiscal year 1997.

The paper proposes that national service be

restricted to 50, 000 participants and that the approximately $1.7
billion in savings be used to (nearly completely) fund 100, 000
recruits under the new, 12 month enlistment option (see table 1).
After the new option's advantages have been evidenced, the program
can be expanded to 200, 000 in a facile manner.
comparative Advantage of the New Military Service Option
The new enlistment option could be easily appended, to the
existing military infrastructure.

Training 100, ooo additional

youth (or even 200, 000) would not put undue stress on existing
military

facilities.

Certainly,

an

increase

in

supervisory

capacity and some facility modification would be needed.

However,

the military chain of command, organizational structure, and system
of education�! and training procedures is in place and fully
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operational.
Alternately,

national

service

will

.require

organizational structure and level of bureacracy.

a

new

Furthermore,

exactly what participants will do in national service remains a
subject of conjecture.

In short, the military/national service

tradeoff replaces an established product with a recognized capacity
for human capital development with an unknown product of an
unproven potential.
Compared to national service, the new military option would be
relatively

cost efficient

(see Table

1).

Even

with

a

33%

supplemental allocation for supervisory and facility enhancement,
the cost of training 100, 000 military recruits is less than
national service.
Such an option woula benefit the greater society in three
ways.

First,

it would continue to extend the potential for

personal development, discipline, and training to less advantaged
youth.

As the military down-sizes, it will become more demanding

in terms of educational attainment and qualification test scores.
Therefore,

the

burden

of

force

reduction

will

be

minorities in particular and the least skilled in general.

borne

by

Second,

on a tax dollar for tax dollar basis, monies spent on military
training will yield a greater net return on social investment than
will national service.

Finally, as the Reserves have become an
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integral part of the active military mission, the program will act
to augment those forces (Binkin and Kaufman, 1989; Sondey, 1994) .

summary
Implicit in the allocation for a national service program are
tradeoffs in terms of reduced expenditures for ongoing programs,
including the military services .

Military force reductions will

most adversely effect minorities by removing the ladder of social
mobility.
military

The new enlistment option would modestly increase
force

size

while

providing

opportunities

disenfranchized not addressed in national service.

for

the

Reducing the

maximum projected strength (1997) of national service to 50,000
from 100,000 would fully fund the new enlistment program while
displacing no one .
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TABLE 1
Cost Projections for New Enlistment Option
under Two Force Increment Regimes
12 Month Enlistment

force increment

100, 000 personnel

200, 000 personnel
a.

cost
$786 x 12 x 100, 000
(overhead @ 33%)
education @ $5000
x 100, 000
Total

= $943 mm
= 311 mm

= 500 mm
= $1, 754 mm

Total = $3, 508 mm

Military basic pay is calculated using 1990 pay tables.

b.
The average monthly pay of a recruit ($786) is derived thusly.
It is assumed that during a fiscal year, the force increment will
be evenly divided between the enlisted ranks of E-1, E-2, and E-3.
The 1990 monthly pay scales for E-1 through E-3 are $684, $803, and
$871, respectively. Therefore, $786 is the average monthly pay.
Admittedly, this is a crude but necessary estimate of the average
monthly wage once the system is fully operational.
c.
It is assumed that recruits will not be promoted beyond E-3
during the 12 month enlistment.
d.
Only base pay is included in the calculations. However, if
benefits such as quarters, food allowances, and medical are
included in the matrix at 50% of base pay, cost benefit analysis
will still weigh in favor of military service (national service
estimate for 1997; 100, 000 participants and a cost of $3. 4
billion).
Source: derived from Statistical Abstract of the United States.
1992. published by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, DC,
1992, p. 345.
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